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1.1    Introduction
For more than ﬁ  fty years, US universities have led the world in research 
and graduate education, building on ﬁ  rm foundations laid down in the 
nineteenth century, and rising to new heights during the twentieth cen-
tury. But in recent years doubts have begun to arise concerning the future 
of US higher education, considered as a producer of graduate and profes-
sional students as well as scientiﬁ  c discoveries. The two are complemen-
tary: faculty that are not at the research frontier are less likely to produce 
top PhDs and MDs, and conversely, faculty who lack top students are less 
likely to do cutting-  edge research. It follows that this chapter’s emphasis 
on research extends to advanced students.1 Furthermore, a strong research 
enterprise improves the quality of undergraduate education in the long run 
and contributes to the ability to undertake advanced training. As far as 
higher education is concerned, none of this is new.
The United States is losing share in scientiﬁ  c research, and perhaps in 
papers accepted in top journals (Hicks 2007), in part because the num-
ber of countries that devote signiﬁ  cant resources to scientiﬁ  c research has 
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increased. This implies intensiﬁ  ed competition for scientiﬁ  c and engineering 
talent and also greater competitiveness of foreign high technology ﬁ  rms 
(Freeman 2006). But in addition to growth overseas, a slowdown has taken 
place within the United States. The growth rate of ﬁ  nancial resources of 
US public universities has declined and this has reduced the growth rate in 
their publications.2 This development is important, because public universi-
ties account for a large share of US science.
It may come as a surprise to hear that US universities could be in danger 
of losing their preeminence, since top US private and public universities 
invariably rank near the pinnacle of world institutions (Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University 2005). But university growth overseas implies that this domi-
nance may not last forever. Moreover, public universities in the United States 
have struggled in recent years.
To understand how top private universities in the United States have 
reached unparalleled heights at the same time that top public universities 
have fallen behind, it is necessary to explain the organization of US higher 
education. It is a mixed public-  private system. Top US private universities 
rely on federal grants, endowments, gifts, and tuition to hire the best faculty, 
select the best students, and sustain their competitive advantage. In this they 
are not constrained by state interests. The situation is otherwise with US 
public universities, whose charter, beginning with the Morrill Act of 1862, 
enjoins them to support state industries by providing aﬀordable and practi-
cal higher education. If state budgets contract, or if competition for state 
funds strengthens, then funding diminishes and the competitive advantage 
of US public universities declines. A pillar of public support for higher edu-
cation, its accountability to state interests erodes and becomes a constraint 
on university growth. In recent years this appears to have taken place.
The chapter’s focal point is a panel of universities and ﬁ  elds observed 
over time. Main ﬁ  ndings from an analysis of these data are as follows. Start-
ing with growth facts, I ﬁ  nd that research output grows at about the same 
rate in the late twentieth century in private schools as in public, until the 
1990s, when public university growth slows down. This is despite the fact 
that stocks of Research and Development (R&D), which are mostly feder-
ally funded, rise appreciably faster in public universities. A slowdown in 
papers and in papers per dollar of R&D is evident in the late 1990s, again 
in public universities. Given the challenges of measuring R&D, I provide 
faculty counts as a supplementary measure. It turns out that faculty grow at 
a slower rate than papers, so research productivity indeed rises. Once again, 
though, it rises more slowly in public universities, especially during the late 
1990s. In addition, the evidence reveals that current funds rise more rapidly 
in private universities, suggesting that in public universities, faster growth 
of (mostly federal) R&D stocks is cancelled by slower growth in tuition 
and state appropriations. Hence, faster growth of current funds in private 
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schools contributes to faster growth of wages and research output in these 
universities.
Continuing with regression ﬁ  ndings, I show that public and private uni-
versities obtain similar percentage increases in scientiﬁ  c papers and citation-
  weighted papers from equal (percentage) increases in R&D, graduate stu-
dents, and current funds, so that diﬀerences in growth of research output 
between the two sets of institutions are the result of diﬀerences in growth 
of resources. Here private universities have recently held the advantage. 
Departments ranked in the top 20 percent of their disciplines obtain a 
larger increase in papers for the same increase in R&D and students than 
departments of lower rank. Graduate students contribute more to papers 
in top 20 percent departments than elsewhere, suggesting the high degree of 
complementarity of faculty and graduate students at the top of the quality 
distribution.
Compensation in private universities rises faster than it does in public 
universities by almost 1 percent per year. Compared to public universities, 
where the wage structure is relatively ﬂ  at, compensation in private schools 
is higher at all ranks and rises more markedly for full professors. This sug-
gests incentives for researchers, especially senior researchers, to migrate from 
public to private universities. Combined with slower growth in current funds 
in public universities, this helps to produce slower growth in their research 
output than in that of private universities.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 provide 
an historical perspective on US universities. Section 1.2 recounts the expan-
sion of research in US universities before, during, and after World War II. 
This is the period in which US universities progress relative to the rest of the 
world. Section 1.3 considers the US contribution to world scientiﬁ  c output 
since the 1980s. The share of the United States declines sharply during this 
period. While this is inevitable in the face of post-  war recovery and world 
economic development, the section also points to a slowdown in research 
output during the 1990s in the United States, due largely to a deceleration 
in the growth rate of resources in US public universities.
Section 1.4 introduces panel data covering 110 top US universities and 
twelve main science ﬁ  elds during 1981 to 1999. Section 1.5 presents growth 
facts concerning university research. Section 1.6 begins with regressions in 
which research output is the dependent variable and concludes with wage 
regressions. Section 1.7 discusses the evidence and draws conclusions for the 
future of US higher education.
1.2      US Universities Since World War II
1.2.1    Pre-  War  Setting
Prior to World War II and unlike the present day, federal R&D was lo-
cated inside the US military (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989, 92 ﬀ.). Agri-36    James  D.  Adams
cultural research is the exception. It was conducted in land-  grant colleges 
founded by the Morrill Act of 1862 and the Land- Grant Act of 1890, extend-
ing the 1862 Act to state agricultural and mechanical colleges for blacks. In 
addition, the Hatch Act of 1887 established experiment stations close to the 
land- grant colleges. Huﬀman and Evenson (1993, ch. 1) provide a summary 
of these developments.3
The ﬁ  rst statistical evidence on university R&D in the United States 
derives from balance sheet data in 1935 and 1936. The data are contained 
in Research—A National Resource, Volume I (National Resources Com-
mittee 1938, section 6).4 A survey of sixty universities yielded total research 
expenditures of $50 million. Of this amount, $16 million was earmarked 
for experiment stations, much of this funded by the Department of Agri-
culture.5 Of the remaining $34 million, seventeen derived from endowment, 
eight from foundations, four from gifts, two from contract research, and 
two from state government. Therefore, the federal government’s main role 
in university research was its support for agriculture.
Bush (1945, 86) contains estimates of research expenditure by sector from 
the 1930s through World War II. The data are limited to natural science.6 
Using as a basis the ﬁ  gure of $50 million reported in National Resources 
Committee (1938), this yields $25 million for natural science research in 
1936. Using survey data on research faculty, this ﬁ  gure is then extrapolated 
backward to 1930 and forward to 1942 to arrive at natural science R&D 
for universities. This is the relatively crude university series shown in ﬁ  g-
ure 1.1.7
The aforementioned summarizes the pre-  war setting. Events surround-
ing World War II led to a vast expansion of university R&D. First, before 
the war, immigration of scientists from Europe signiﬁ  cantly increased the 
science and engineering workforce. Second, during the war, a sharp rise in 
defense research increased the demand for scientists and engineers, which 
the Cold War institutionalized.8 Third, after the war, the GI Bill helped 
3. The democratic and equal- opportunity conditions set by the early US patent system (Khan 
2005) may have complemented the later establishment of universities focused on the agricul-
tural and mechanical arts—the very type envisaged by the Morrill Act.
4. Individual evidence on university R&D exists before 1935 to 1936. The University of 
Chicago conducted an internal survey of research costs in 1929 and 1930 and the University 
of California undertook a similar survey in 1928 and 1929. But these data lack the comparative 
breadth of the National Resources Committee survey.
5. In 1940 federal R&D expenditures were $74 million, of which $29 million or 39 percent, 
consisted of Department of Agriculture R&D (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998, 27). Clearly, 
agricultural research assumed a much larger role in the federal government and universities 
than it does today.
6. In these early data, natural science includes biological, mathematical, and physical science, 
plus engineering.
7. Industrial R&D statistics are obtained by multiplying industrial researchers by R&D per 
worker of $4,000. See Research—A National Resource, Volume II (National Resources Com-
mittee 1941, section IV).
8. By an increase in demand I mean throughout a shift to the right of the demand curve for 
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ﬁ  nance college education for returning soldiers, which subsequently pro-
duced a spike in enrollments and increased post-  war demand for faculty. I 
discuss each of these factors in turn.
1.2.2      The Intellectual Migration from Europe, 1933–  1944
The supply of highly skilled scientists to the United States increased due 
to the ﬂ  ight from Hitler’s Europe, but by how much, and in what proportion? 
The main statistical source is Davie (1947), who directed data collection for 
the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe.9 Using 
the criterion of “refugee, arrival from Europe as place of last residence,” 
statistics of immigration and naturalization yielded 22,842 refugees in the 
professions during 1933 to 1944. The refugees were assigned to detailed 
occupations: 507 were chemists, 2,471 engineers, 3,415 professors and teach-
ers, and 1,907 were “scientists or literary persons,” yielding a total of 8,300 
refugees in science, engineering, and related professions. In 1938 the Na-
tional Resources Committee, using American Men of Science, 6th edition 
(1938), estimated that 28,000 US men and women were researchers in the 
natural sciences, and that 22,000 more were in the humanities and social 
sciences (National Resources Committee 1938, 171) for a total of 50,000 
across all sectors of the economy.10 Thus, while the intellectual migration 
from Europe during the 1930s was small by modern standards, it was large 
Fig. 1.1    R&D in the United States, 1930–  1944 (millions of 1958 dollars)
Sources: R&D dollars, Bush (1945, 86); implicit GDP deﬂ  ator, US Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census (1975, part 1, series E13).
9. Fermi (1971) recounts individual biographies of this wave of immigrants by detailed occu-
pation, including scientists and engineers by their separate specialties. Her time period, 1930 to 
1941, is earlier than that of Davie (1947), whose perspective I adopt here.
10. The committee judged that of the existing stock of 50,000 researchers, 5,000 or (10 
percent) were in the ﬁ  rst rank.38    James  D.  Adams
for the time. Put another way, if half of the roughly 8,000 refugees in science 
and engineering and related ﬁ  elds were engaged in research—not excessive, 
given their occupations—then this constitutes an increase of 4,000 persons 
on a base of 50,000, or 8 percent. And since they specialized in natural 
science and engineering, then the increase could be almost 4,000 on a base 
of 28,000, or 14 percent.11
There is reason to think that even this understates growth at the highest 
levels of research. Table 1.1 illustrates.12 Twelve refugees had won a Nobel 
Prize by 1947, the most prestigious international award.13 Using a sample 
collected by Davie (1947) of 707 refugees who served on university faculties 
in Europe, 203 persons were accounted distinguished in their disciplines, 
of which 181 were in natural science. To assess the meaning of this, turn 
to table 1.2, which compiles US-  resident Nobel Prize winners by decade. 
The number of foreign-  born is shown in parentheses for each subject area, 
except for the sum across areas, where the foreign-  born appear as column 
(2).14 Noting that twenty- three prizes had been won by US residents by 1940, 
with none foreign- born except for one award, I conclude that the intellectual 
migration from Europe increased resident Nobel Prize winners by 50 per-
cent.15
Table 1.2 also shows that major improvements in US universities were 
under way by the 1930s. Across areas, the number of native- born prizes rises 
from one to seventeen per decade during 1901 to 1940. Excluding economics 
prizes—since these did not exist until 1969—the total of seventeen prizes for 
the 1930s is half the native-  born total, per decade, during 1971 to 2007.
1.2.3      Increase in Federal R&D During World War II
Besides the increase in the pre-  war supply of highly skilled scientists and 
engineers, the increase in military R&D during and after the war produced 
a sustained rise in demand for scientists and engineers. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 
illustrate.16
Figure 1.1 shows R&D expressed in millions of 1958 dollars in industry, 
government, and colleges and universities during 1930 to 1944. The data are 
11. Following the usage of Bush (1945) and Davie (1947), in this section natural science refers 
to biology, medicine, mathematics and statistics, and engineering, in addition to chemistry and 
physics.
12. The data are compiled from appendix C of Davie (1947).
13. The Fields Medal in mathematics dates from 1936 and competes with the Abel and Wolf 
prizes. Other awards of distinction, such as the National Medal of Science in the United States, 
are national in scope.
14. In this table, Nobel Prizes in science include chemistry, physics, and physiology or medi-
cine.
15. The foreign-  born award belongs to Albert A. Michelson, for the Michelson-  Morley 
experiment on the invariance of the speed of light.
16. The data on federal R&D are of higher quality during this period than the data on aca-
demic and industrial R&D, because they derive from annual cost accounts. All these data are 







Sample of refugee 
professorsc
Biology; physiology or medicine 2 72 91
Chemistry 1 28 63
Physics or astronomy 6 40 77
Mathematics n.a. 41 53
Literature 3 15 65
Economics n.a. 7 60
Total   12   203   409
Note: n.a.   not applicable.
aThese are Nobel Prize winners by the time of Davie (1947).
bDistinguished Refugees are compiled by Davie (1947, 432–40), from Who’s Who in America 
(1944–1945) and American Men of Science (1944).
cSample consists of 707 refugees in Davie (1947) who were formerly on university faculties in 
Europe, of which 409 were in the disciplines shown.



















1901–1910 2 1 1 0 1 n.a.
(1)
1911–1920 3 0 1 0 2 n.a.
1921–1930 5 0 2 1 2 n.a.
1931–1940 13 0 9 2 2 n.a.
1941–1950 22 5 15 2 5 n.a.
(5)
1951–1960 29 7 27 1 1 n.a.
(7)
1961–1970 32 10 27 1 3 1
(10)
1971–1980 52 14 40 3 1 8
(7) (3) (1) (3)
1981–1990 48 15 37 1 1 9
(11) (1) (1) (2)
1991–2000 52 12 39 1 1 11
(9) (3)
2001–2007 46 9 31 0 2 13
(6) (3)
All years 304 73 229 12 21 42
            (56)   (4)   (2)   (11)
Note: n.a.   not applicable.
aScience Nobel Prizes include separate awards in physics, chemistry, and in physiology or 
medicine.
bThe Nobel Prize in economics began in 1969. Thus, economics prizes for the 1961 to 1970 
decade are limited to 1969 and 1970. Data compiled from Nobel Archives at www.nobel.org.40    James  D.  Adams
reported every two years.17 They show that federal R&D rises from less than 
200 million in 1940 to over 1.2 billion by 1944.
To the beneﬁ  t of US universities the Cold War produced a sustained rise 
in the demand for scientists and engineers. Figure 1.2 shows Federal R&D 
in 1958 dollars for the years 1947 to 1968.18 Total federal R&D amounted 
to $1 billion in 1947, rising to $12 billion by 1968. Nearly all R&D expendi-
tures were on defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, or NASA.
1.2.4      Post-  War Demand for Higher Education
Mobilization produced a wartime decline in male college enrollment and 
degrees. But under the GI Bill this decline was succeeded by a large spike 
around 1950. Figure 1.3 shows BA and BS degrees from 1932 to 1960.19 
Baccalaureate degrees earned by men rise during the 1930s, then decline 
from a peak of 100,000 in 1940 to a trough of 50,000 in 1946, and ﬁ  nally 
spike to 350,000 in 1950. By comparison, the decline and recovery of degrees 
17. To convert current into constant dollars I have used the implicit GDP deﬂ  ator with 1958 
set to 1.0. This chart, as I have noted, derives from Bush (1945, 86).
18. The source of the R&D data is US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 
(1975, Part 2, series W 126, 129, 137, and 138). These are deﬂ  ated by the implicit GDP deﬂ  ator 
for government purchases of goods and services (indexed to 1958) that appears in US Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975, Part 1, series E 13).
19. The data on BA and BS degrees derive from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
the Census (1975, Part 1, series H 752–  754).
Fig. 1.2    Federal R&D, 1947–  1968 (millions of 1958 dollars)
Sources: R&D dollars, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975, part 2, 
series W126, W129, W137, and W138); implicit GDP deﬂ  ator, US Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census (1975, part 1, series E13).Is the United States Losing Its Preeminence in Higher Education?    4 1
earned by women are slight. As the stock of excess demand for education 
diminished during the 1950s, baccalaureate degrees fell and did not regain 
their 1950 peak until the mid-  1960s.
Figure 1.4 shows PhD degrees from 1932 to 1960.20 These increase from 
2,000 to almost 4,000 during the 1930s, decline to 2,000 by 1946, and increase 
Fig. 1.3    Baccalaureate degrees in the United States, 1932–  1960
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975, part 1, series H752–  H754).
Fig. 1.4    PhD degrees in the United States, 1932–  1960
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975, part 1, series H761–  H763).
20. The data on PhD degrees derive from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census (1975, Part 1, series H 761–  763).42    James  D.  Adams
to 10,000 in 1960. Unlike baccalaureate degrees, the ﬂ  ow of PhDs rises 
smoothly, reﬂ  ecting the strength of long-  run prospects for advanced skills.
World War II and the Cold War led to sustained growth in US academic 
science. Throughout the subsequent period, growing demand for under-
graduate and graduate education fueled continued expansion of US uni-
versities.
1.3    World  Scientiﬁ  c Output Since the 1980s
Having discussed forces that led to expansion of research in US universi-
ties from the 1930s to the 1980s, I now examine the recent role of the United 
States in world scientiﬁ  c research. I shall use scientiﬁ  c papers as a measure 
of the public or “commons” aspects of science.21 Figure 1.5 shows relative 
growth of papers in the United States compared to the EU-  15 group of 
European countries, East Asia, and rest of the world.22 Clearly, US papers 
grow slowly compared to most regions, and growth equals zero from 1997 
to 2002. The EU- 15 countries surpass the United States in total publications 
by 1997 and they maintain this lead into the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century. East Asia 
grows more rapidly than any other region, including the EU-  15, but it does 
so from a small base.
Figure 1.6 constructs regional shares in world scientiﬁ  c publications over 
the period 1988 to 2005. Deﬁ  nitions of the regions diﬀer slightly from ﬁ  gure 
1.5.23 The EU-  23 supersedes the EU-  15 and the Asia-  10 countries replace 
East Asia.24 On these broader deﬁ  nitions, Europe’s share of world scientiﬁ  c 
papers surpasses that of the United States in 1996. The US share falls from 
38 percent to 29 percent during this period. The EU-  23 share peaks in 1998 
but then declines. All shares decline except Asia-  10, with the US decline the 
fastest of all.
Figures 1.7 through 1.9 display regional shares in world citations in 1992, 
1997, and 2003.25 The charts show an accelerating decline in the US share 
of citations, though nowhere is this as great as the decline for papers. The 
EU-  15 gain share; and the share of East Asia, while it is small, grows the 
21. Alternative measures of commercial licenses and patents are beyond the scope of this 
chapter.
22. The EU-  15 consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
These are the EU countries before the addition of countries of Eastern Europe. East Asia 
consists of Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. The source of ﬁ  gure 1.5 is 
appendix table 41, chapter 5, National Science Board (2006).
23. The source of these data is appendix table 41, chapter 5, National Science Board (2006) 
and appendix table 34, chapter 5, National Science Board (2008).
24. The EU- 23 countries are the EU- 15 plus new member countries Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. The Asia-  10 countries con-
sist of East Asia (Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) plus India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.
25. The data source is appendix table 61, chapter 5, National Science Board (2008).Fig.  1.5  Scientiﬁ  c papers by region, 1988–  2003
Source: National Science Board (2006, chapter 5, appendix table 41).
Fig. 1.6    Shares in world scientiﬁ  c papers, 1988–  2005
Sources: National Science Board (2006, chapter 5, appendix table 41); National Science Board 
(2008, chapter 5, appendix table 34).44    James  D.  Adams
fastest. At the end of the period, because of gains in Europe, 75 percent of 
citations are still received by America and Europe compared with 70 percent 
at the start.
Figure 1.10 depicts the US share in the top 1 percent, top 5 percent, and 
top 10 percent most cited papers from 1992 to 2005.26 The share erodes at 
every level, and though it is hard to see, the percentage decline is less for top 








Rest of the World
Fig. 1.7    Citation shares by region, 1992
Source: National Science Board (2008, chapter 5, appendix table 61).
Fig. 1.8    Citation shares by region, 1997
Source: National Science Board (2008, chapter 5, appendix table 61).
26. The data source is appendix table 63, chapter 5, National Science Board (2008).
Fig. 1.9    Citation shares by region, 2003
Source: National Science Board (2008, chapter 5, appendix table 61).Is the United States Losing Its Preeminence in Higher Education?    4 5
from 65 percent of the world total in 1992 to 55 percent in 2005. This is a 
decline of 15 percentage points (10/  65). The top 5 percent share declines 
from 38 percent to 30 percent, a decline of 21 percentage points. So erosion 
in share is less at higher levels of citation impact, though some may see this 
as cold comfort.
But what does all this mean? Share data tell us little about welfare. Output 
adjusted for quality, and output relative to input, are what matter for growth 
and technical eﬃciency of an industry, and universities are no exception to 
this rule. All we can say is that the growth rate of US scientiﬁ  c publications 
has fallen and that growth is slow relative to other regions, but we have not 
addressed the factors that drive this slowdown.
Foreign competition for science and engineering students is unlikely to be 
responsible.27 If that were the reason, then the skill of foreign science and 
engineering graduate students entering US universities would have under-
gone serious decline in recent years. But this seems implausible given the 
attractiveness of US education and employment. Alternatively, the slow-
Fig. 1.10    US share in world output of highly cited papers, 1992–  2005
Source: National Science Board (2008, chapter 5, appendix table 63).
27. In the long run, arguments concerning the diﬀusion of science and R&D vary in their 
implications for welfare of advanced countries like the United States. If technology converges 
in science and in industrial research then the share of innovative products produced in advanced 
countries will decline. Standard models build on the theory of trade with diﬀerentiated products 
(Helpman and Krugman 1986). North- South models of innovation, imitation, and trade based 
on this approach (Krugman 1979; Grossman and Helpman 1991) assume that all innovation 
occurs in the North, while the South merely imitates. But if advanced human resources arise 
in the South as well, then innovation is distributed across both North and South, as Freeman 
(2006) points out. In that case the proﬁ  ts from new products are also distributed across both 46    James  D.  Adams
down could represent crowding out of US authors in top journals (Hicks 
2007), or diversion to commercial activities (Toole and Czarnitski 2007), 
or earmarking to less eﬃcient institutions (De Figueiredo and Silverman 
2006).
The recent slowdown could derive from other domestic causes and this is 
the approach that I am about to pursue. I show in section 1.5 that growth of 
scientiﬁ  c publication in US private universities did not slow down much in 
the 1990s compared with the 1980s. In contrast, a pronounced deceleration 
did occur in public universities. In explaining the diﬀerence, a deceleration 
in resource growth during the 1990s seems to be the most likely explanation 
for the slowdown in public universities. I explore this hypothesis in sections 
1.5 and 1.6.
1.4      Panel Data on US Universities
1.4.1    Data  Construction
With the goal of explaining the slowdown in US academic research, I 
turn to empirical work using a panel of 110 top US universities. I begin by 
describing the data. In their raw form they consist of 2.4 million scientiﬁ  c 
papers, published during 1981 to 1999, that have at least one author from a 
top 110 US university. These universities account for more than 80 percent 
of US academic research during this period.28
Papers consist of articles, reviews, notes, and proceedings. The data source 
is Thomson-  Reuters Scientiﬁ  c.29 Papers follow the ﬁ  eld that Thomson 
assigns to the journal in which they appear.30 “Field,” in this case, is one of 
eighty- eight subﬁ  elds. To link the data to the National Science Foundation’s 
regions and the North can lose some industries with supra-  normal proﬁ  ts. Applying this line 
of reasoning to universities as an industry suggests that the United States could lose the lead in 
some sciences, which in turn might contribute to less eﬀective industrial research in the United 
States. But countervailing forces also apply if product varieties grow with the world economy. 
First, knowledge ﬂ  ows to industries in advanced countries will increase, including universities, 
so that scientiﬁ  c discoveries and inventions of new products could increase. Second, the larger 
world economy that results from the South’s entry into advanced nation status would create 
markets for the North, including in scientiﬁ  c research. So it is not clear whether the North gains 
or loses as a result of the South’s development.
28. According to National Science Board (2002), appendix table 5-  4, in 1999 the top 100 
US universities account for $22.10 billion of R&D out of $27.49 billion of R&D for all US 
universities. This equals 80.4 percent. National Science Board (2008), appendix table 5-  11 
indicates that in 2006 the top 100 account for $38.09 billion out of $47.76 billion for all US 
universities. This equals 79.8 percent. Since the sample consists of the top 110 and not the top 
100, its share in R&D expenditures exceeds 80 percent. Publication data reﬂ  ect R&D spending, 
so the publication share also exceeds 80 percent.
29. The journal set consists of approximately 5,500 journals that were active in 1999, as well 
as 1,600 inactive (renamed or out of print) journals that were cited by active journals.
30. This assignment is reasonable for specialized journals because of the breadth of ﬁ  elds 
that I use. But the method produces serious errors for the 1 percent of journals (about 70) that 
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(NSF) Computer-  Aided Science Policy Analysis and Research (CASPAR) 
database, I assign each of the eighty-  eight to one of NSF’s twelve main 
ﬁ  elds.31
The data record publication year, journal ﬁ  eld, institutional aﬃliation, 
address information on city, state, and country, and author names, as well 
as number of authors.32 Address information is used to identify university 
aﬃliations of those who collaborate on a paper and to compute fractional 
papers. By fractional, I mean that if a paper is written by researchers in two 
universities, then each university is assigned half the paper. If three collabo-
rate, then each receives a third, and so on.33 I add up fractional papers by 
university, ﬁ  eld, and year to form “eﬀective” papers produced in a university-
 ﬁ eld. By treating the data in this way I avoid multiple counting of papers 
of US universities taken as a whole. Likewise I compute (forward) citations 
received by a paper in its ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years, including year of publication, and 
I calculate fractional ﬁ  ve-  year citations in the same manner as for papers, 
but excluding citations from the same institution. I accumulate fractional 
citations by university, ﬁ  eld, and year to form an estimate of “eﬀective” 
citation-  weighted papers in a university-  ﬁ  eld.34
These steps yield research “output” in a university, ﬁ  eld, and year. Fol-
lowing along these lines I form a panel of universities, ﬁ  elds, and years. 
The panel combines papers and citations with university-  ﬁ  eld level R&D, 
university- ﬁ  eld PhD students and post-  doctoral students, and character-
istics of doctoral programs; as well as ﬁ  nancial characteristics of parent 
universities. The measure used for R&D is a calculated depreciated stock 
based on past R&D expenditures. The NSF- CASPAR database of universi-
ties, a compendium of NSF surveys, is the source for university R&D and 
for graduate and post-  graduate students. The HEGIS (Higher Education 
General Information Surveys) surveys of the US Department of Education 
provide ﬁ  nancial data at the university level on tuition revenues, state appro-
of biology because biology accounts for the largest number of its papers. Multidisciplinary 
journals include Nature, Science, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, and 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Wholesale assignment to biology here is clearly 
wrong. But to correct the problem would require article (not journal) assignments to ﬁ  elds. 
Also, some Multidisciplinary journals are primarily focused on biology. Therefore, the problem 
applies to less than 1 percent of the journals.
31. The twelve ﬁ  elds are: agriculture, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, earth 
sciences, economics and business, engineering, mathematics and statistics, medicine, physics, 
and psychology.
32. There is no limit on the number of authors. The maximum number in the sample is 210, 
while the mean is 2.36.
33. The cumulative distribution of universities listed on papers is: one university, 79.6 per-
cent; two universities or less, 96.8 percent; three universities or less, 98.3 percent; and four 
universities or less, 99.5 percent. It follows that the fractions assigned are almost always 1, 1/  2, 
1/  3, or 1/  4.
34. It is tempting to think of university-  ﬁ  elds as departments, but this is misleading. The 
same ﬁ  eld can be practiced by more than one department and (rarely) multiple ﬁ  elds can be 
practiced within one department.48    James  D.  Adams
priations (for public universities), endowments, auxiliary revenues from fees, 
and total revenues. The National Research Council (NRC) 1993 Survey of 
Doctoral Programs (NRC 1995) includes rankings of PhD programs, and I 
use these to stratify departments by relative standing.35
In the basic panel of universities I consider only leading university-  ﬁ  elds 
(“departments”) from the top 110. Their number depends on size of ﬁ  eld: I 
include the top twenty- ﬁ  ve universities in astronomy, the top ﬁ  fty in agricul-
ture, chemistry, computer science, economics and business, earth sciences, 
mathematics and statistics, physics, and psychology, and the top seventy- ﬁ  ve 
in biology, medicine, and engineering. Summing across ﬁ  elds, and account-
ing for the fact that forty- eight formal schools of agriculture exist, the panel 
consists of 648 top university-  ﬁ  elds. My purpose in breaking out few indi-
vidual schools in small ﬁ  elds and more in large ﬁ  elds is to avoid empty cells 
for universities where ﬁ  elds are small or nonexistent.36 The result is a panel 
that contains papers and citation-  weighted papers for 648 university-  ﬁ  elds 
in twelve main sciences during 1981 to 1999. This implies a total of 12,312 
observations before exclusions due to missing values. In some cases I stratify 
the data into top 20 percent, middle 40 percent, and bottom 40 percent 
university- ﬁ  elds. A ﬁ  eld that contains ﬁ  fty university-  ﬁ  elds has ten in the 
top 20 percent, twenty in the middle percent, and twenty in the bottom 40 
percent, and so on. The university-  ﬁ  eld dimension allows for greater vari-
ability of R&D stock, graduate students, and other variables within a uni-
versity. It increases the robustness of the ﬁ  ndings when university dummies 
are included. The price of this detail is that lagged faculty counts must be 
replaced by lagged R&D stocks and a moving average of graduate students. 
These are the primary indicators of resources that are available at the uni-
versity, ﬁ  eld, and year level.
1.4.2    Descriptive  Statistics
Table 1.3 contains descriptive statistics for major variables. The table 
reports means, standard deviations, minima, and maxima. Groups consist 
of “all,” “private,” and “public” universities. The last two are the groups used 
in the rest of the empirical work.
I begin with research output. Mean (fractional) papers in all universi-
ties are 177 per university-  ﬁ  eld and year. They are slightly larger in private 
schools. The data indicate considerable variation, especially among private 
schools. The ﬁ  eld with the most papers is in a private university. The mean 
of ﬁ  ve-  year (fractional) citations received (citation-  weighted papers) is 520 
35. The NRC ranks are not available for agriculture and medicine. For these ﬁ  elds I sort 
universities by their 1998 R&D and assign a rank of 1 to the university with the largest R&D 
and so on in descending order.
36. The size of the remainder of the top 110 equals an average university-  ﬁ  eld in the indi-
vidual top twenty- ﬁ  ve, ﬁ  fty, or seventy- ﬁ  ve schools. This reﬂ  ects the positive skew of academic 
R&D. For more on this point see Adams and Griliches (1998).Table 1.3  Descriptive statistics, panel of universities, ﬁ  elds, and years
Variable    Analytical level   Mean  
Standard 
deviation   Min   Max
Papersa
  All  universities University-  ﬁ  eld 176.8 210.9 0.5 2,559.1
  Private 183.1 256.2 1.3 2,559.1
  Public 173.6 183.2 0.5 1,317.6
Five-  year citations receiveda
  All  universities University-  ﬁ  eld 520.1 1,078.9 0 21,954.2
  Private 693.8 1,518.7 0.9 21,954.2
  Public 430.8 743.4 0 7,710.8
Number of facultyb
  All  universities University 1,236.3 614.6 42 3,083
  Private 802.1 371.6 179 2,461
  Public 1,459.9 595.0 42 3,083
Stock of R&D (millions of 1992 US$)c
  All  universities University-  ﬁ  eld 83.3 112.7 0.0 1,441.1
  Private 83.4 116.6 0.0 828.9
  Public 83.3 110.6 0.2 1,441.1
Tuition revenues (millions of 1992 US$)d
  All  universities University 120.4 83.9 0.7 547.4
  Private 158.1 94.7 13.0 547.4
  Public 101.0 70.2 0.7 413.0
State appropriations (millions of 1992 US$)d
  All  universities University 155.9 132.0 0 489.7
  Private 11.1 30.6 0 160.8
  Public 230.5 97.8 23.9 489.7
Endowment (millions of 1992 US$)d
  All  universities University 553.9 890.7 0.013 6,553.7
  Private 1,118.9 1,029.4 55.3 6,553.7
  Public 258.7 632.7 0.013 5,089.6
Graduate studentse
  All  universities University-  ﬁ  eld 258.7 343.1 0.0 4,904.0
  Private 198.3 363.1 0.0 4,904.0
  Public 289.8 328.1 0.0 2,705.0
Auxiliary/total revenuesd
  All  universities University 0.096 0.045 0.006 0.302
  Private 0.077 0.040 0.006 0.245
  Public 0.105 0.045 0.007 0.302
Enrollment/facultyf
  All  universities University 21.5 6.4 4.8 40.1
  Private 16.4 4.9 6.5 28.9
  Public       24.1   5.4   4.8   40.1
Notes: Period is 1982 to 1999. Sources of the data are described in the text and include: Thomson- Reuters Scientiﬁ  c, the 
CASPAR database of the National Science Foundation, and the HEGIS database of the National Center for Education 
Statistics.
aPapers and citations received are fractionally assigned to universities in the manner described in the text.
bThe number of faculty is the number of tenure-  track plus nontenure-  track faculty. These data derive from HEGIS.
cThe stock of R&D is deﬁ  ned at the university-  ﬁ  eld level. It derives from the NSF-  CASPAR database of universities.
dAll the ﬁ  nancial variables derive from HEGIS.
eThe number of lagged graduate students is for a university-  ﬁ  eld. It is an average over the previous three years. These 
data derive from the NSF-  CASPAR database of universities.
fThe enrollment data derive from HEGIS.50    James  D.  Adams
per university, ﬁ  eld, and year. This is 33 percent higher in private schools 
and 17 percent lower in public schools. Again the maximum occurs in a 
private university.
For comparison I report faculty counts. Since these exist only at the uni-
versity level they indicate total research labor.37 The average school employs 
slightly more than 1,200 faculty, private schools employ 800, and public 
schools employ 1,500. A smaller faculty in private schools produces the 
same papers per university-  ﬁ  eld, but appreciably more citation-  weighted 
papers, than do faculty in public schools. Note that I compare total faculty 
in universities with papers and citations at the university-  ﬁ  eld level. But 
this comparison is also valid at the university level (Adams and Clemmons 
2009).
Research & Development stock signiﬁ  es lagged resources that enter into 
research. It is the depreciated sum of total R&D from federal and other 
sources in a university-  ﬁ  eld over the previous eight years.38 The deprecia-
tion rate is 15 percent; underlying R&D ﬂ  ows are expressed in millions of 
1992 dollars using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) university R&D 
deﬂ  ator (Robbins and Moylan 2007). The R&D stock in ﬁ  eld i, university 
j, at time t, is
(1) 
     
R&D Stockijt = (0.85)




Mean R&D stock is about $80 million. Research output varies more than 
R&D, and private universities produce more research than expected, given 
their R&D stocks, suggesting that other, less readily observed resources are 
greater in these universities.
Financial statistics of tuition, state appropriations, and endowment de-
rive from HEGIS. These are expressed in millions of 1992 dollars using 
the implicit gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂ  ator. The data are at the uni-
versity level.39 Financial resources could be used to support more and better 
faculty. For example, tuition in private universities is used to cover start-  up 
packages for assistant professors in science and engineering (Ehrenberg, 
Rizzo, and Jakubson 2007). Not surprisingly, and despite smaller enroll-
ments, private schools have larger tuition revenues and larger (nontax) en-
dowments. State appropriations capture the “tax endowment” of public 
universities. I construct the following measure of current revenue in uni-
versity j:
37. The data include untenured as well as tenure track faculty. In the top 110 about 90 percent 
are tenure track according to HEGIS. Note that data on faculty by university and ﬁ  eld have 
not been collected since 1985.
38. I chose an eight-  year lagged stock because the NSF CASPAR R&D data begin in 1973 
and papers begin in 1981. It is therefore the maximum length of stock that is available given 
the data.
39. One diﬃculty with the ﬁ  nancial variables is that they are not available for the late 1990s. 
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(2) Revenuej,t   Tuitionj,t 1   Public ∗ State Appropriationsj,t 1.
In equation (2) “public” is a dummy indicator equal to one in public uni-
versities and zero otherwise so that in private universities revenue is tuition, 
since “public” equals zero. But in public universities it is tuition plus state 
appropriations on the assumption that appropriations substitute for tuition 
in public universities. I lack a history of revenue, but I lag equation (2) by 
one year in the research output equations to approximate lagged resources. 
I treat endowment separately from revenue, since it is a stock, and since it 
may be earmarked for diﬀerent uses. Note that I use the endowment stock 
because endowment income is poorly measured in HEGIS.
The moving average of the stock of graduate students over the previous 
three years captures numbers of research assistants:
(3) 
     




Table 1.3 shows that public universities employ more graduate students. But 
numbers of undergraduates are also larger, requiring more of the graduate 
students to serve as teaching assistants. Besides this, large public university 
programs in engineering include masters as well as PhD students. For these 
reasons, equation (3) is likely to be a noisy indicator of research assistance, 
and yet it is the best measure that I have.
I use the ratio of auxiliary/ total revenues (from HEGIS) to indicate ﬁ  nan-
cial duress. Auxiliary revenues are fee- for- service charges for residence halls, 
food services, athletics, student unions, stores, and movie theaters.40 I divide 
auxiliary by total revenues to abstract from size of university. The mean of 
this ratio is 0.10, although it ranges from zero to 0.30.
To motivate the use of auxiliary/  total revenues, suppose that tuition is 
price-  controlled in a public university. This could occur in states that guar-
antee tuition to families of students, since the states must then cover tuition 
if the price cap were to be lifted (Rizzo 2006). If fees were increased in 
small amounts, then they might substitute for tuition in this setting. Like-
wise, private universities with small endowments and gifts could use fees to 
ﬁ  nance their operations. Fees in this interpretation resemble hidden prices 
for university attendance.
Table 1.4 reports correlations among auxiliary/ total revenue, enrollment/ 
faculty, tuition plus state appropriations per student, and endowment per 
student. The enrollment/  faculty ratio, or the student-  teacher ratio, is 
positively correlated with auxiliary/  total revenue. Since an increase in the 
student-  teacher ratio spreads limited resources over more students, it also 
may indicate ﬁ  nancial duress.41 Tuition plus state appropriations per student 
40. Hospital revenues are separate from auxiliary revenues.
41. An alternative view is that a higher student- teacher ratio automatically increases the share 
of auxiliary fees. It is by no means perfect as an indicator of ﬁ  nancial duress.52    James  D.  Adams
and endowment per student capture more abundant resources per student. 
They are the opposite of ﬁ  nancial duress (Ehrenberg 2002). They should be, 
and are, negatively correlated with the ﬁ  nancial duress indicators, which in 
this study are auxiliary/  total revenue and enrollment/  faculty.
1.5      Growth of University Research
I now use the university panel data described in section 1.4 to provide an 
overview of the growth of university research. Understanding these facts 
is helpful in interpreting the regression analysis of university research in 
section 1.6. To this end, I have composed three summary tables that are 
designed to facilitate discussion of trends in university research productivity 
and the US slowdown in publication rates during the 1990s.
Table 1.5 presents totals of papers, citation- weighted papers, PhD degrees 
awarded, and R&D stock in private and public universities. The data consist 
of 620 university- ﬁ  elds (out of 648 possible), observed over 1982 to 1999, for 
which there are no missing values. To aid in the interpretation, I report values 
relative to 1982 in square brackets. In brief, the data tell us that the output 
of papers grows by slightly more (slightly less) than 50 percent in private 
(public) universities; that citations grow by 125 percent in both groups (from 
1982 to 1995); and that PhDs grow by a third in both. Since citations rise 
with the growing ease of citation and with the number of researchers who 
cite, citation growth is best regarded as an upper bound on the growth of 
research output. But since papers have genuinely become more inﬂ  uential, 
growth of papers is a lower bound. Therefore, growth of research output 
lies between 50 and 125 percent.
This provides a broad range of growth in research output, but what 
about input? I start by examining the behavior of R&D stock deﬂ  ated by 
the implicit GDP deﬂ  ator. This grows by 105 percent (130 percent) in private 
Table 1.4  Correlations among ﬁ  nancial indicators
   
Auxiliary/
total revenue  
Enrollment/
faculty  








Tuition   state  –0.41 –0.50 1.00
 appropriations/student (  0.0001) (  0.0001)
Endowment/student –0.25 –0.35 0.21 1.00
    (  0.0001)   (  0.0001)   (  0.0001)    
Notes: See text and table 1.3 for data sources and deﬁ  nitions of the ﬁ  nancial indicators. (Sig-
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(public) schools. The R&D growth exceeds publication and PhD growth: 
surely, one supposes, this is a recipe for a slowdown in research productivity. 
But R&D growth is overstated, because the GDP deﬂ  ator understates cost 
increases in universities and overstates growth of real R&D. The evidence in 
table 1.12, on rising real compensation of faculty, helps to make this clear.
For this reason I prefer the BEA price index for university R&D (Robbins 
and Moylan 2007), because it takes university wage costs into account, and 
I use the BEA index to deﬂ  ate R&D stock in all the regressions to follow. 
When I use the BEA index instead of the implicit GDP deﬂ  ator to calculate 
real R&D, I ﬁ  nd that R&D in private universities grows by 72 percent, not 
Table 1.5  Scientiﬁ  c papers, PhDs, and R&D stock by university type, selected years
University type, variable   1982   1986   1990   1995   1999
A Private schools
Papers 27,591 30,776 33,342 40,022 41,952
[1.00] [1.12] [1.21] [1.45] [1.52]
5- year  citations 83,641 110,371 140,938 187,763 —
[1.00] [1.32] [1.69] [2.24]
PhD degreesa 48,374 48,512 55,178 60,278 63,840
[1.00] [1.00] [1.14] [1.25] [1.32]
R&D stock (mill. of 1992 US$)b
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 10,296 11,709 14,641 17,775 21,099
[1.00] [1.14] [1.42] [1.73] [2.05]
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator 11,927 13,109 15,435 17,873 20,478
[1.00] [1.10] [1.29] [1.50] [1.72]
B Public schools
Papers 49,851 56,312 63,566 73,985 74,158
[1.00] [1.13] [1.28] [1.48] [1.49]
5- year  citations 101,746 125,394 173,066 229,657 —
[1.00] [1.23] [1.70] [2.26]
PhD degreesa 116,709 117,402 126,311 153,026 155,505
[1.00] [1.01] [1.08] [1.31] [1.33]
R&D stock (mill. of 1992 US$)b
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 18,400 21,771 27,963 36,385 42,257
[1.00] [1.18] [1.52] [1.98] [2.30]
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator 21,312 24,366 29,468 36,567 41,030
    [1.00]   [1.14]   [1.38]   [1.72]   [1.93]
Notes: Value relative to 1982 in brackets. See the text and table 1.3 for data sources and deﬁ  nitions of the 
variables. Data are a balanced panel of university-  ﬁ  elds, deﬁ  ned as a matched sample that includes the 
same observations in all years. The sample includes all the data. Papers and ﬁ  ve-  year citations received 
are fractional and are adjusted for collaboration among universities. Dashed cells indicate that data are 
not available for the data set.
aPhD degrees are speciﬁ  c to university- ﬁ  elds and belong to twelve main ﬁ  elds of science and engineering: 
agriculture, astronomy, biology, chemistry, computer science, earth science, economics and business, 
engineering, mathematics and statistics, medicine, physics, and psychology.
bR&D stock is deﬂ  ated by the GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator in the ﬁ  rst row, and by the BEA University 
R&D input deﬂ  ator (Robbins and Moylan 2007) in the second row. Both price indexes are normalized to 
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105 percent. Likewise I ﬁ  nd that growth in public schools is 93 percent, not 
130 percent. Using the improved deﬂ  ator, real R&D grows by 70 (90) per-
cent in private (public) universities, while research output grows by 50/  125 
percent in both. In this way the gap narrows between growth of articles and 
growth of real R&D.
Even so, growth of real R&D is likely to be overstated despite the use 
of the BEA deﬂ  ator. First, interuniversity grants probably grow in impor-
tance during this time because of large projects in biology and other ﬁ  elds. 
Since grants are not apportioned among schools in the statistics until well 
after 1999, R&D is increasingly overcounted because of this. Second, an 
increasing amount of funding could be targeted for training of graduate 
students rather than faculty research. To assess research productivity with 
more accuracy it would be useful to separate funds for research from funds 
for pure training. A related point might be important, if universities move 
from institutional to grant support of graduate students. To that extent, 
grants replace internal funds and they are not additional funds for research. 
I mention these problems not because I have solutions to them but in the 
interest of producing better statistics on university R&D in the future.
Table 1.5 shows that publications in private universities grow more slowly 
than R&D stock. The same point applies even more strongly to public uni-
versities. While growth of papers slows down during 1995 to 1999 in private 
universities, it virtually stops in public universities. However, the growth 
rate of papers recovers somewhat during 2000 to 2005 (see ﬁ  gure 1.5) so this 
slowdown is to some extent temporary.42
Table 1.6 constructs ratios of papers, citations, and PhD students to R&D 
stocks using the GDP and BEA deﬂ  ators, and it examines their growth. 
Using the BEA deﬂ  ator, papers per million dollars decline over time in 
private schools by –  11 percent, but the decline is –  23 percent in public 
universities. Citations per million also grow signiﬁ  cantly faster in private 
universities. In comparing research productivity, it is useful to remember 
that faculty compensation rises by almost 1 percent faster a year in private 
universities. Almost paradoxically, this may explain why papers (citations) 
per million dollars of R&D fall less (rise more). It is because labor quality 
grows at a faster rate in private universities due to faster wage growth in these 
universities. Finally, PhD students per million dollars decline by 50 percent 
in both types of university.
Table 1.7 takes a diﬀerent look at university resources. It records enroll-
ment, tenure track and non-  tenure track faculty, and tuition (in public uni-
versities, tuition plus state appropriations). All variables are at the university 
level. Values relative to 1982 are again placed in square brackets. These 
42. For all academic institutions, total scientiﬁ  c papers published fell from 139,168 in 1995 to 
138,472 in 1999. But by 2005 this total had increased to 159,972. Numbers of scientiﬁ  c papers 
reﬂ  ect year of entry into the database rather than year of publication. See National Science 
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measures track teaching loads as well as human and ﬁ  nancial resources 
over time.
Growth in enrollments in both private and public institutions is about 10 
percent by 1997. Since PhD degrees increase by one- third, enrollment shifts 
toward (more costly) graduate education. Numbers of faculty grow by 25 
percent in private universities, but by 8 percent in public universities. Most 
of the growth in private universities occurs at the end, during a period of 
rapid growth in stock market and endowment values. Its eﬀects will be felt 
in the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century. Tuition revenue grows by 124 percent in private 
universities but tuition plus state appropriations in public universities grow 
by just 46 percent. The divergence in resources becomes obvious during the 
1990s. It helps to account for diﬀerences in private- public productivity, since 
we shall show that current revenues support research.
Endowments grow at the same rate in all institutions, though the diﬀerence 
in endowment per faculty remains large. It is 1.39 million in private universi-
ties versus 0.15 million in public universities. Endowment is simply too small 
in most public institutions to aﬀect faculty resources very much.
Table 1.6  Research output/R&D stock by university type, selected years
University type, variable   1982  1986  1990  1995   1999
A Private schools
Papers/R&D stock
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 2.68 2.63 2.28 2.25 1.99
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator 2.31 2.35 2.16 2.24 2.05
5-  year citations/R&D stock
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 8.12 9.43 9.63 10.56 —
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator 7.01 8.42 9.13 10.51 —
PhD degrees/R&D stock
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 4.70 4.14 3.77 3.39 3.03
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator 4.06 3.70 3.57 3.37 3.12
B Public schools
Papers/R&D stock
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 2.71 2.59 2.27 2.03 1.75
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator 2.34 2.31 2.16 2.02 1.81
5-  year citations/R&D stock
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 5.53 5.76 6.19 6.31 —
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator 4.77 5.15 5.87 6.28 —
PhD degrees/R&D stock
    Using GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 6.34 5.39 4.52 4.21 3.68
    Using BEA university R&D input deﬂ  ator   5.48   4.82   4.29   4.18   3.79
Notes: See the text and table 1.3 for data sources and deﬁ  nitions of the variables. Data are a 
balanced panel of university- ﬁ  elds, deﬁ  ned as a matched sample that includes the same obser-
vations in all years. Papers and 5-  year citations received are fractional and adjusted for col-
laboration among universities. R&D stock is deﬂ  ated by the GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator in the 
ﬁ  rst row for each of the variables, and by the BEA University R&D input deﬂ  ator (Robbins 
and Moylan 2007) in the second row. Both price indexes are normalized to 1992. Dashed cells 
indicate that data are not available for the data set.56    James  D.  Adams
Together, tables 1.5 and 1.7 provide a new perspective on university 
research productivity. Table 1.5 shows that papers increase by 50 percent 
during this period, while citation-  weighted papers increase by 125 percent. 
Table 1.7 shows that faculty increase by 10 to 25 percent. Papers per fac-
ulty increase by either measure, and this draws attention to the point made 
earlier, that growth of university R&D is overstated. At the same time, re-
search productivity in public universities has clearly fallen behind that of 
the privates.
1.6    Regression  Findings
1.6.1    Equation  Setup
To better understand the determinants of research productivity, I turn to 
a regression analysis of the university, ﬁ  eld, and year panel. Tables 1.8 and 
Table 1.7  Enrollment, faculty, and ﬁ  nancial resources by university type, 
selected years
University type, variable   1982   1986   1990   1997
A Private schools
Enrollment 403,875 413,824 428,522 446,495
[1.00] [1.02] [1.06] [1.11]
Faculty 21,527 22,352 23,246 26,960
[1.00] [1.04] [1.08] [1.25]
Tuition (mill. of 1992 US$)a 2,975 4,034 5,026 6,668
[1.00] [1.36] [1.69] [2.24]
Endowment (mill. of 1992 US$)b 13,768 19,531 27,645 37,361
[1.00] [1.42] [2.01] [2.71]
B Public schools
Enrollment 1,895,564 1,908,438 1,999,802 2,053,056
[1.00] [1.01] [1.06] [1.08]
Faculty 80,112 80,458 84,448 86,158
[1.00] [1.00] [1.05] [1.08]
Tuition   state appropriations (mill.  14,554 17,400 19,706 21,242
  of 1992 US$)a [1.00] [1.20] [1.35] [1.46]
Endowment (mill. of 1992 US$)b 4,524 6,879 8,309 12,619
    [1.00]   [1.52]   [1.84]   [2.79]
Notes: Value relative to 1982 in brackets. See the text and table 1.3 for data sources and deﬁ  ni-
tions of the variables. Data are a balanced panel, deﬁ  ned as a matched sample that includes 
the same observations in all years. Enrollment consists of all students, both graduate and 
undergraduate, in the fall of each year. Faculty include both tenure-  track and non-  tenure- 
track personnel.
aTuition and state appropriations end in 1997 owing to suspension of data collection in the 
HEGIS surveys beginning in 1998.
bEndowment data end in 1996 instead of 1997 owing to suspension of data collection in the 
HEGIS surveys beginning in 1997. The endowment data are missing for about 20 percent of 
universities so the matched sample is smaller than for other variables. Deﬂ  ator for revenue and 
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1.9 present pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for private and 
public universities. By pooled, I speciﬁ  cally mean regressions that combine 
ﬁ  elds in a given university. As I have shown, the university-  ﬁ  eld dimension 
of the data allows for variability within universities that helps to identify 
eﬀects of R&D stock and other variables.
The regressions follow three basic formats that we describe next. Let yijt 
be the logarithm of research output (papers or citations) in ﬁ  eld i, university 
j, at time t; let the vector xijt consist of logarithms of R&D stock, graduate 
students, and current revenue deﬁ  ned by equations (1), (3), and (2); and let 
the vector zjt stand for ﬁ  nancial variables at the university level (endowment 
in logarithms; auxiliary/ total revenue, and enrollment/ faculty). Also, Di is a 
vector of ﬁ  eld dummies.43 Then the “total” equation that omits university 
dummies is:
(4)  yijt        0t    xxijt   iDi   ej   uijt.
Financial variables zjt are omitted from equation (4), but they are included 
in (4 ):
(4 )  yijt        0t    xxijt    zzjt   iDi   ej   uijt.
In equations (4) and (4 ), ej is a university error component that may be 
correlated with the right- hand variables, while uijt is a transitory component 
that is uncorrelated over time both with itself and with the contemporaneous 
right- hand  variables.
The “within” equation adds university dummies to equation (4 ):
(5)  yijt        0t    xxijt    zzjt   iDi   jDj   uijt.
In equation (5), the vector of university dummies Dj absorbs the university 
error component, so that ej    jDj.44
I also include time trend in equations (4), (4 ), and (5) to indicate residual 
growth. If trend increases when university eﬀects are included, then this may 
indicate that research output shifts toward universities where output grows 
more slowly (Adams and Clemmons 2009).
1.6.2      Pooled Regressions: Private Universities
Table 1.8 reports estimates for private universities. Following (4), column 
(8.1) includes trend, R&D stock, and the stock of graduate students. All 
are highly signiﬁ  cant, and together they explain most of the variation in 
papers.45 The elasticity of R&D stock is 0.41, while that of graduate stu-
43. In other regressions I include shares of full and associate professors to capture aging 
eﬀects. The shares are insigniﬁ  cant. Unlike individual productivity of scientists (Stephan and 
Levin 1991, 1992) where age is signiﬁ  cantly negative, at the university and ﬁ  eld level rank is 
insigniﬁ  cant. One explanation for the diﬀerence is that selective pressures favor more productive 
researchers. Promotion in the aggregate counteracts individual aging.
44. See Hsiao (2003, chapters 2 and 3) for derivations of estimators of the slope coeﬃcients 
in total and within regressions.
45. See Adams and Griliches (1998) for a related analysis.58    James  D.  Adams
dents is 0.16. It follows that an expansion of R&D and graduate students 
of 10 percent results in 5.7 percent more papers in private universities, indi-
cating diminishing returns to research resources. Following equation (4 ), 
column (8.2) adds ﬁ  nancial variables. Lagged tuition is linked to an increase 
in papers, but this is not statistically signiﬁ  cant. The coeﬃcient of endow-
ment is positive and marginally signiﬁ  cant. Auxiliary/  total revenue and 
enrollment/ faculty  (ﬁ  nancial duress) reduce research output, but again are 
not statistically signiﬁ  cant. As in equation (5), column (8.3) adds university 
dummies. Tuition revenue now enters signiﬁ  cantly as do the indicators of 
ﬁ  nancial duress. In columns (8.2) and (8.3), trend becomes insigniﬁ  cant 
so that growth of research output is fully explained. R&D stock and gradu-
ate students decline slightly, but remain signiﬁ  cant.
Columns (8.4) through (8.6) explain ﬁ  ve-  year citations received. While 
the elasticity of R&D stock increases compared to the earlier regressions 
for papers, that of graduate students declines and becomes insigniﬁ  cant. 
Endowment is linked to an increase in citations, suggesting that private uni-
Table 1.8  Ordinary least squares research regressions: Private universities
Variable or statistic   Log (papers)   Log (5-  year citations)
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6
Field dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
University dummies included No No Yes No No Yes
Regression structure Total Total Within Total Total Within
Time trend 0.0102∗∗ –0.0018 –0.0035 0.0333∗∗ 0.0097 –0.0112
(0.0025) (0.0050) (0.0087) (0.0042) (0.0070) (0.0121)
Log (R&D stock in mill. of  0.413∗∗ 0.369∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.563∗∗ 0.474∗∗ 0.377∗∗
 1992  US$) (0.045) (0.039) (0.036) (0.059) (0.052) (0.043)
Log (graduate students) 0.157∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.132∗ 0.092 0.083 0.088
(0.049) (0.047) (0.055) (0.054) (0.057) (0.066)
Log (tuition rev. in mill. of  0.137 0.270∗ 0.186 0.624∗∗
 1992  US$) (0.086) (0.129) (0.130) (0.214)
Log (endowment in mill. of  0.102∗ 0.055 0.205∗∗ 0.196∗∗
 1992  US$) (0.050) (0.071) (0.070) (0.076)
Auxiliary/total rev. –1.912 –1.832∗ –1.517 –1.233
(0.985) (0.796) (1.438) (1.001)
Enrollment/faculty –0.015 –0.009∗ –0.029∗ –0.004
(0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005)
Number of observations 3,255 2,636 2,636 2,523 2,454 2,454
R2 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.90
Root MSE   0.471   0.448   0.407   0.641   0.597   0.536
Notes: Robust, clustered standard error in parentheses. See the text and table 1.3 for data sources and 
deﬁ  nitions of the variables. MSE   mean squared error.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Is the United States Losing Its Preeminence in Higher Education?    5 9
versities use endowment to buy release time and hire star faculty. As with 
papers, trend is not signiﬁ  cant once the ﬁ  nancial indicators are included.
In all these production functions and those in succeeding tables, the sum 
of the output elasticities across R&D stock, graduate students, tuition reve-
nue, and endowment is less than 1.0. This suggests decreasing returns to scale 
in university research and limits to university size, consistent with Adams 
and Clemmons (2009). The relevance of this point is that, allowing for ﬁ  xed 
costs of research and after the eﬃcient scale is reached, research may be bet-
ter shifted to universities in which it was previously missing. We shall return 
to this point in the summary and conclusion in section 1.7.
1.6.3      Pooled Regressions: Public Universities
Table 1.9 reports results for public universities. In general, output elas-
ticities of R&D stock are less than in table 1.8 for private schools. One 
diﬀerence, though, is the larger elasticity of the stock of graduate students, 
Table 1.9  Ordinary least squares research regressions: Public universities
Variable or statistic Log (papers) Log (5-  year citations)
    9.1   9.2   9.3   9.4   9.5   9.6
Field dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
University dummies included No No Yes No No Yes
Regression structure Total Total Within Total Total Within
Time trend 0.0115∗∗ 0.0023 0.0144∗∗ 0.0415∗∗ 0.0236∗∗ 0.0448∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0028)
Log (R&D stock in mill. of  0.341∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.416∗∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.397∗∗
 1992  US$) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Log (graduate students) 0.288∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(0.042) (0.038) (0.041) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046)
Log (tuition   state 
  appropriations in mill. of 0.267∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.224∗ 0.163
 1992  US$) (0.063) (0.048) (0.092) (0.084)
Log (endowment in mill. of  0.019 –0.018 0.050∗∗ –0.044∗∗
 1992  US$) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Auxiliary/total rev. –1.384∗∗ 0.124 –2.389∗∗ 0.459
(0.401) (0.157) (0.634) (0.349)
Enrollment/faculty –0.009∗ –0.004∗ –0.008 –0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
Number of observations 6,552 4,678 4,678 5,088 4,378 4,378
R2 0.84 0.86 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.89
Root MSE   0.429   0.400   0.342   0.634   0.595   0.506
Notes: Robust, clustered standard error in parentheses. See the text and table 1.3 for data sources and 
deﬁ  nitions of the variables. MSE   mean squared error.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.60    James  D.  Adams
about 0.1 higher and signiﬁ  cant throughout. This may indicate that gradu-
ate student assistants are funded in public universities, to a larger extent, by 
means other than R&D, such as teaching assistantships. Research output 
rises, usually signiﬁ  cantly, with tuition plus state appropriations. Endow-
ment does not contribute to research output in public universities, because 
amounts per faculty member are too small to matter. Auxiliary/  total rev-
enues and enrollment/ faculty enter with the expected negative signs, but are 
insigniﬁ  cant once university eﬀects are taken into account.
The trend coeﬃcient is also greater in the public university regressions. 
The coeﬃcient of trend is even higher in the “within” regressions (columns 
[9.3] and [9.6]) than in total. Again, this may reﬂ  ect a shift of research toward 
schools where output growth is slower (Adams and Clemmons 2009). Some 
of trend growth could also be due to knowledge ﬂ  ows from private universi-
ties, since knowledge ﬂ  ows are more likely to take place from higher to lower 
ranked departments (Adams, Clemmons, and Stephan 2006) and since top 
departments are more often found in private universities.
1.6.4    Regressions  Stratiﬁ  ed by Rank of University-  Field
Let us now consider university-  ﬁ  elds stratiﬁ  ed into groups according to 
top 20, middle 40, and bottom 40 percent rankings. Table 1.10 contains 
frequency distributions of the top 20, middle 40, and bottom 40 by private 
and public ownership. The top 20 and middle 40 percent account for most 
of the private school observations. In contrast, public school observations 
cluster in the middle and bottom 40 percent. Even so, public universities 
contain almost half of the top 20 percent university-  ﬁ  elds. The stratiﬁ  ed 
regressions take this into account by analyzing diﬀerences in quality wher-
ever they occur.
Table 1.11 reports estimates of equations (4 ) and (5). It shows results 
for the top 20, middle 40, and bottom 40 percent in panels A, B, and C, 
respectively. Because I separate university-  ﬁ  elds into groups by rank, the 
Table 1.10  Relationship of rank of university-  ﬁ  elds to private and public schools
Rank of university-  ﬁ  eld
University type   Top 20%   Middle 40%   Bottom 40%   All
Private 72  90  52 214
(33.6%) (42.1%) (24.3%) (100%)
Public 56 160 190 406
    (13.8%)   (39.4%)   (46.8%)   (100%)
Notes: Row percents in parentheses. See the text for data sources and a description of the 
underlying panel data. Data consist of 620 private and public university-  ﬁ  elds from 103 uni-
versities after exclusion of missing values. Top ten universities include eight private and two 
public schools.Table 1.11  Stratiﬁ  ed OLS research regressions: Top 20, middle 40, and bottom 40 percent 
university- ﬁ  elds
Log (papers) Log (5-  year citations)









A Top 20 percent university-  ﬁ  elds
Equation no. 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4
Time trend 0.0089∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0158∗
(0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0079)
Log (R&D stock in mill. of 1992 US$) 0.310∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.270∗∗
(0.057) (0.076) (0.058) (0.077)
Log (graduate students) 0.157∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.193∗∗
(0.049) (0.062) (0.052) (0.075)
Number of observations 1,501 1,501 1,407 1,407
R2 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.92
Root MSE 0.365 0.328 0.447 0.413
B Middle 40 percent university-  ﬁ  elds
Equation no. 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8
Time trend 0.0063∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0337∗∗ 0.0475∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0057)
Log (R&D stock in mill. of 1992 US$) 0.297∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.301∗∗ 0.304∗∗
(0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.048)
Log (graduate students) 0.151∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.075 0.043
(0.041) (0.053) (0.047) (0.062)
Number of observations 3,077 3,077 2,877 2,877
R2 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.92
Root MSE 0.349 0.283 0.492 0.420
C Bottom 40 percent university-  ﬁ  elds
Equation no. 11.9 11.10 11.11 11.12
Time trend 0.0114∗ 0.0231∗∗ 0.0414∗∗ 0.0539∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0030) (0.0054) (0.0064)
Log (R&D stock in mill. of 1992 US$) 0.222∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.252∗∗
(0.044) (0.038) (0.049) (0.051)
Log (graduate students) 0.083 0.100 –0.006 0.089
(0.051) (0.057) (0.055) (0.069)
Number of observations 2,736 2,736 2,548 2,548
R2 0.81 0.87 0.84 0.89
Root MSE   0.447   0.374   0.624   0.541
Notes: Robust, clustered standard error in parentheses. See the text and table 1.3 for data sources and 
deﬁ  nitions of the variables. Top 20, middle 40, and bottom 40 percent groups are ranked according to 
ﬁ  eld using 1993 NRC rankings, except for agriculture and medicine, where, because of missing data, 
university- ﬁ  elds are ranked by size of R&D expenditure. All regressions include ﬁ  eld dummies. Total 
regressions exclude university dummies while within-  regressions include them. Also included are Log 
(tuition   public ∗ state appropriations), Log (endowment), auxiliary/total revenue, and enrollment/
faculty. MSE   mean squared error.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.62    James  D.  Adams
regressions are stratiﬁ  ed, though they are pooled across ﬁ  elds.46 I focus on 
key variables consisting of trend, R&D, and graduate students, not report-
ing results for the ﬁ  nancial variables, although these are included in the 
regressions.
Top 20 percent university-  ﬁ  elds obtain more research output from R&D 
and graduate students than the middle or bottom 40 percent.47 Indeed, 
graduate students in the bottom 40 percent fail to make any signiﬁ  cant con-
tribution to research. This implies that their primary duties are to teach and 
work on thesis research. This and the faculty time needed for dissertation 
work, reduce the net student contribution to zero in bottom 40 percent 
university- ﬁ  elds.
Below the top 20 percent the pattern in the trend coeﬃcients suggests that 
research output grows more rapidly in the within regressions, which include 
university eﬀects, than in the total regressions that exclude these eﬀects. As 
before, this pattern could be due to a shift in output toward universities in 
which growth is less (Adams and Clemmons 2009).
1.6.5      Faculty Compensation and Wage Structure
The empirical work concludes with a regression analysis of faculty com-
pensation by professorial rank—or in other words, the academic wage 
structure. Studying this structure could help us to further understand the 
ﬁ  nancial condition of universities. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of wages plus fringe beneﬁ  ts in 1992 dollars at the full and assistant profes-
sor ranks.48 These are university- wide averages, since HEGIS, which is their 
source, does not collect wage data by university-  ﬁ  eld. Since compensation 
is an average I cannot estimate a typical wage equation where wages are a 
function of education, experience, and tenure. But faculty quality is reﬂ  ected 
in the logarithm of the university-  wide R&D stock per faculty, the loga-
rithm of tuition revenue per faculty (private schools) or tuition plus state 
appropriations per faculty (public schools), the logarithm of endowment 
per faculty, and the ﬁ  nancial duress indicators, auxiliary/  total revenue and 
46. Following section 1.4, top 20 percent regressions include the top ﬁ  ve in astronomy; the top 
15 in biology, medicine, and engineering; and the top 10 in all other ﬁ  elds. Middle 40 percent 
regressions include the next 10 in astronomy; the next 30 in biology, medicine, and engineer-
ing; and the next 20 in all other ﬁ  elds. Bottom 40 percent regressions include the bottom 10 
in astronomy; the bottom 30 in biology, medicine, and engineering; and the bottom 20 in all 
other ﬁ  elds.
47. These results are similar to ﬁ  ndings for top ten universities not reported here. The top 
ten are selected on the basis of top ten citation impact per paper in a set of twenty-  one ﬁ  elds 
during 1981 to 1993. Schools ranked as top ten most frequently among these ﬁ  elds are con-
sidered a top ten university. They include eight private schools (Harvard, Yale, Chicago, MIT, 
Stanford, Princeton, Cornell, and California Institute of Technology) as well as two public 
schools (Berkeley and the University of Washington). It should come as no surprise that top 
20 percent university-  ﬁ  elds predominate in top ten universities.
48. All monetary variables besides R&D are deﬂ  ated by the GDP implicit price deﬂ  ator 
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enrollment/  faculty. In constructing per capita variables on the right-  hand 
side of the wage equations, I lag the number of faculty to limit division error 
bias. Besides the aforementioned, I include trend to capture general wage 
growth, and a cost of living indicator for whether a university is located in 
a large city (in the United States, a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical 
Area). The speciﬁ  cation is:
(6) Log(Wagejt)        0t    LLarge City   xjt   ujt.
These are “total” wage regressions that omit university eﬀects because 
wage variation is insuﬃcient in the within-  university dimension to permit a 
“within” speciﬁ  cation.
Table 1.12 contains the results. The dependent variable in columns (12.1) 
and (12.4) is the logarithm of full professor compensation; in columns (12.2) 
Table 1.12  Faculty compensation equations
Private universities Public universities
Full Asst. Full- asst. Full Asst. Full- asst.
Variable or statistic   12.1   12.2   12.3   12.4   12.5   12.6
Year 0.0174∗∗ 0.0257∗∗ –0.0083∗∗ 0.0139∗∗ 0.0155∗∗ –0.0014
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0010)
Large city (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.098∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.032 0.017 0.016
(0.025) (0.024) (0.014) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024)
Log (R&D stock/faculty) 0.039∗∗ 0.054∗∗ –0.015 0.017 0.019 –0.003
(0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011)
Log [(tuition   public ∗ state  0.080 –0.035 0.116∗∗ 0.137 0.121∗ –0.002
 appropriations)/faculty]a (0.057) (0.053) (0.042) (0.073) (0.056) (0.037)
Log (endowment/faculty) 0.040 –0.014 0.054∗∗ 0.011 –0.003 0.013
(0.021) (0.023) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Auxiliary/total revenue –0.068 –0.260 0.192 –0.095 –0.329 0.206
(0.287) (0.245) (0.148) (0.271) (0.182) (0.170)
Enrollment/faculty –0.006 –0.001 –0.005∗ –0.004 –0.002 –0.002∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
No. of observations 485 485 485 879 879 879
R2 0.77 0.68 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.12
Root MSE   0.078   0.088   0.053   0.108   0.093   0.068
Notes: Robust, clustered standard error in parentheses. See the text and table 1.3 for data sources and 
deﬁ  nitions of the variables. Dependent variable is Log (wage   fringe beneﬁ  ts) in equations labeled 
“Full” for full professors, and “Asst.” for assistant professors; it is the diﬀerence in the logarithm of wage 
  fringe beneﬁ  ts for full and assistant professors in equations marked “Full-  Asst.”
aThe variable “Public” equals 1 if a university is public, and 0 otherwise, so the variable equals the loga-
rithm of tuition for private universities and the logarithm of tuition   state appropriations in public 
universities.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.64    James  D.  Adams
and (12.5) it is the logarithm of assistant professor compensation; and in 
columns (12.3) and (12.6) it is the diﬀerence of the two.
Starting with the results for full and assistant professors, the trend co-
eﬃcients show that real compensation grows at about 1.5 percent a year, 
all else equal, but faster in private universities, especially at the assistant 
professor level, where it grows at 2.5 percent.49 Location in a large city raises 
private school wages by 5 to 10 percent, although it has no signiﬁ  cant eﬀect 
on wages in public schools, probably because state institutions are mostly 
located outside large cities. For full professors in private universities, R&D 
stock and endowment increase compensation. Besides trend, the only signiﬁ  -
cant determinant of compensation in public universities is current revenue 
consisting of tuition plus state appropriations.
Columns (12.3) and (12.6) display the results for the diﬀerence in com-
pensation for full and assistant professors. In the private university column 
(12.3), we see that location in a large city, tuition, and endowment increase 
the wage premium for senior faculty, but trend and enrollment/  faculty de-
crease it. In the public university column (12.6), the wage structure is ﬂ  at 
across ranks. Together the ﬁ  ndings suggest that successful researchers have 
an incentive to move to private universities that increases with the rank of 
full professor.
1.7      Discussion, Synthesis, and Conclusion
Is the United States losing its preeminence in higher education? The evi-
dence presented in this chapter suggests that in a relative sense it is. Sections 
1.2 and 1.3 tell a story of rapid post-  war expansion of US universities, fol-
lowed by a tapering oﬀ after 1980. A series of natural experiments took 
place in the 1930s and 1940s that contributed to this growth. Because of 
their exogeneity, these early events may in time capture the imagination of 
researchers studying higher education.
In the early years, growth of US universities was aided by refugee scien-
tists, with foreign graduate students playing a larger role after 1980. Addi-
tional early factors that contributed to expansion of US universities include 
a broadening of access to universities, increased military research during 
World War II and the Cold War, and the expansion of high technology 
industries during the post-  war period. Since the 1980s we observe more 
rapid growth of academic research in Europe, and especially East Asia, 
that implies convergence in world science and engineering and a decline in 
the US share.
49. The compensation gap between private and public universities rises at the rate of 0.8 
percent a year. In simple regressions that include trend and intercept, I ﬁ  nd that, relative to the 
GDP deﬂ  ator, both full and assistant professor compensation grows at 2.3 percent per year in 
private universities and at 1.5 percent per year in public universities. Top ten university com-
pensation grows at 2.2 percent per year. R2s for these regressions range from 0.3 to 0.5.Is the United States Losing Its Preeminence in Higher Education?    6 5
But this is not the entire story. Most recently, in the 1990s, we observe 
a slowdown of publication output in the United States. This becomes the 
central puzzle of the chapter, and sections 1.4 through 1.6 address it using 
panel data on universities, ﬁ  elds, and years. In section 1.4 we describe the 
panel, and in section 1.5 we present growth facts concerning US university 
research. These reveal that much of the slowdown in publication is located 
in public universities. While R&D stocks grow more rapidly in public than 
private schools, current revenues grow more slowly. This suggests that pub-
lic universities fall behind because of slower growth in their ﬁ  nancial re-
sources.
The regression ﬁ  ndings in section 1.6 indicate a fairly similar if not per-
fectly identical production process in public and private universities. On 
average, both obtain similar increases in scientiﬁ  c papers from similar com-
bined increases in R&D, graduate students, tuition revenues, and endow-
ment. This is true even though graduate students play a larger role in public 
universities, perhaps because research is cross-  subsidized by teaching assis-
tantships more of the time. In view of this broad similarity, a divergence in 
research output over time, in which public universities fall behind, can only 
be accounted for by a lower rate of increase in public university resources, 
as section 1.5 reveals.
In support of this hypothesis, compensation in private universities rises 
almost 1 percent a year faster than in public universities. And besides, wages 
are ﬂ  at across professorial rank in public universities, whereas they rise 
noticeably with rank in private universities. All this suggests reasons for top 
scientists to migrate from public to private universities. Therefore, in sev-
eral ways slower growth in current revenues in public universities produces 
slower growth of research as well.
At the same time, (mostly federal) research funding expands at a faster 
rate in public schools (Adams and Clemmons 2009). Together this tells an 
interesting story of state and federal policy interactions. Even as (mostly 
federal) R&D is expanding, the states are subjected to a portion of rising 
health care costs under Medicaid. In addition, some are subject to man-
dated equalization of K through 12 education expenditures that raise the 
cost of elementary and secondary education (Murray, Evans, and Schwab 
1998). Toward the end of the period some states commit themselves to pre-
paid tuition plans that are inadequately funded (Rizzo 2006). So growth of 
mostly federal research dollars is cancelled out by the slower growth of state 
dollars in public universities.
An obvious question that arises is whether this situation will persist. If it 
is temporary, then the downward ﬂ  uctuations of ﬁ  nances of public univer-
sities during the 1990s would be compensated by upward ﬂ  uctuations at a 
later time, leaving public institutions on the same unaltered trend line with 
little to be concerned about in the long run. But if the situation is permanent 
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top public universities would have to seek alternative sources of funding to 
begin to catch up to top private universities. They might, for example, seek to 
obtain freely ﬂ  oating tuition from parents of students anywhere in the world. 
But this solution seems unlikely given the charters of state universities and 
ownership of their real assets by the states. More likely is a gradual removal 
of tuition price controls to in-  state families amidst a frank recognition that 
price caps deny public universities the resources that are essential to a good 
education. Still another solution revolves around increased commercializa-
tion of university inventions as well as increased sales of merchandise and 
entertainment, though the latter are hardly consistent with the academic 
missions of these institutions. All these adjustments to the new realities seem 
destined to occur slowly, so that relative shortfalls of public universities are 
likely to persist for years to come.
On a worldwide scale, the relatively faster growth of universities in newly 
industrializing countries will continue. This is because this growth is part 
of a convergence process in the developing world, in which steady-  state 
incomes and growth rates increase as a function of increases in education 
and stocks of knowledge. Even if funding problems of US public universities 
could be resolved through improved mechanisms of ﬁ  nance, the decline in 
the US share of world science will likely persist.
Yet another possibility arises. All that we have seen in this chapter, which 
covers more than 80 percent of academic research in the United States, 
consists of a ﬁ  xed set of top 110 institutions. Tables 1.8, 1.9, and 1.11 show 
that these universities are subject to decreasing returns to scale in research, 
since the sum of the output elasticities of R&D stock, graduate students, 
and ﬁ  nancial resources is less than one. Since this is the deﬁ  nition of decreas-
ing returns, one might suppose that beyond the eﬃcient scale, more growth 
could be obtained at less cost by spreading research funds over a wider range 
of universities. Of course, organizational assets in smaller research institu-
tions are not necessarily the equal of those in top 110 schools. It follows that 
if sustained growth of research output is the objective, then the challenge is 
not only that of spreading resources across more schools, but also that of 
replicating the assets of top universities. At present, growth appears to be 
more rapid in universities where this kind of replication remains an open 
question.
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